Conclusions

The culture of secrecy pervasive in public administrations is both longstanding and obstinate. The term 'public servant' implies that authorities should represent ordinary people's interests in the face of voracious logging companies, but the reverse appears to more often be the case. There a many factors behind a lack of downward accountability:

• There is a conflict of interest if the forest authority is both regulator and manager, as managers are then accountable only to themselves.
• Where forest authorities have been taken out of the traditional command and control ministerial structure, and a board of directors or commissioners has been created, they often lack meaningful civil society representation.
• Where such a board doesn't exist and the authority remains within the direct line-management of a ministry, there are few other effective means for the political authorities to apply pressure on forest authority performance.
• Weak or non-existent platforms for civil society often means the demand for disclosure and accountability is incoherent and unstructured, and this is exacerbated where there is no Freedom of Information legislation.

Additionally, if communities are supported in their sense of ownership of the forest they will be more willing to cooperate in law-enforcement activities. Conversely, if they feel the forest has been taken from them, and that government is now collecting significant sums of money through various taxes, it alone should take responsibility and have the resources to enforce the law.

Institutional change can be a trigger for a shift away from a tradition of secrecy and towards a more participatory approach. The major institutional changes in Perú, for example, have been identified as an opportunity for civil society groups to engage. Part of these changes have come about through administrative decentralisation, which in principle brings decisions closer to people. However the process can also create gaps and overlap in responsibilities, and requires the time and resources to educate new local administrators to their roles. Making the Forest Sector Transparent in Perú is engaging on this through support to decentralised offices of the Ombudsman / Human Rights Commission.

Voluntary Partnership Agreements (VPAs), which aim to control legality in the timber trade with the EU, appear to be an important opportunity for increased openness on the part of forest authorities. The experience from two VPA front-runners, Ghana and Cameroon, is largely positive for both access to information and participation:

• VPA development has been through a consultative process, increasing the likelihood that all stakeholder groups will support the resulting agreement and its implementation.
• The question of 'what is legal timber', has to be answered precisely and has required a consensus-building approach. This has been one of the most deliberative stages of VPA development.
• Consequently there is a commitment to legislative reform that will provide an opportunity to address longstanding issues of community rights.
• NGO staff have proven themselves more knowledgeable than officials in some respects, and this expertise has been recognised.
• Appendices to the VPA explicitly provide for information dissemination, listing what documents should be available.
• Implementation of the VPA is jointly overseen by the country concerned and the EU, strengthening the effectiveness of performance monitoring and sanctions.

VPA negotiations in Liberia have now commenced, and a free trade agreement between Europe and Perú is expected to contain similar commitments.

Forest forum-type platforms are valuable. They may be called different things in different places - Community Forestry Development Committees (CFDCs) in Liberia, roundtable dialogues in Perú - but they all provide a regular venue for interaction between citizens and the state, not one just predicated on a particular consultation or new law.

With the right kind of support, local civil society representatives, as forest forums, CFDCs or progressive traditional leaders, all have the potential to provide a useful model upholding and promoting best practice in transparency and accountability. They can set standards for the private sector, public officials, local government and others to follow.

Greater transparency on revenue distribution is an 'easy win'. It fits well with broader governance reforms such and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and open budgeting processes, and there is already some progress towards transparency of forest revenue redistribution. Also, as so many players are involved, it would set up some checks and balances.

Whereas there is a tendency to focus on the logging sector, other sectors -- notably carbon but also protected area designation, large-scale agricultural concessions, mining and possibly ecotourism concessions -- are all subject to the same governance and transparency pressures, and therefore require the same support in terms of information, understanding, preparedness, participation in the policy process, and monitoring in their implementation.

Although this is only the first year of a pilot methodology in four countries, the report card has already demonstrated its value in providing a means to evaluate transparency and the participation in the forest sector. These are key components, not just for reasons of fairness and justice, but public participation can improve the quality of decision making, improve respect for those decisions and improve people's perception of government actions. Conversely, as tragically demonstrated in Perú this year, to avoid transparency and ignore efforts for participation can be extremely expensive in time and resources, and lives.

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